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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE BONA FIDE
SENIORITY SYSTEM: FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL
UNION NO. 1784 v. STOTTS
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits employment dis-
crimination based upon race, color, religion, sex or national origin.2 In
framing this legislation, Congress intended to provide equal employ-
ment opportunities for all citizens and to remove any barriers operating
to preserve the effects of prior discriminatory practices.' Employers
and unions, however, due to the widespread use of "last hired, first
fired" seniority systems,4 have eliminated many of the gains made by
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin: or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment,
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
3. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Supreme Court stated:
"The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of
the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees." Id. at 429-30.
4. In a 1983 survey the Bureau of National Affairs found seniority provisions in
89% of all collective bargaining contracts. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIc
PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 74 (1983). The Bureau learned that employers used
seniority as the sole factor in determining layoffs in 59% of the agreements, compared
to 46% in 1975 and 42% in 1973. Id. at 52. See generally Developments in the Law-
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1109, 1156 (1971).
The Supreme Court has defined a "seniority system" as "a scheme that, alone or in
tandum with non-'seniority' criteria, allots to employees ever improving employment
rights and benefits as their relative lengths of pertinent employment increase." Califor-
nia Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 606 (1980). See also Cooper & Sobol, Sen-
iority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach of Objective
Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1601-02 (1969).
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minorities under the Act.5 In response to this development, minorities
have recently turned to the courts for resolution of the conflicts be-
tween existing seniority systems and the various remedial provisions
adopted pursuant to Title VII.6 In Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts,7 the United States Supreme Court held that a district court
could not unilaterally modify a consent decree such that it interferes
with the provisions of a bona fide seniority system, where the decree is
silent regarding the policy to be followed in the event of future layoffs.8
In Stotts, black members of the Memphis Fire Department sought a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the City of Memphis from carrying
out proposed layoffs.9 The members argued that the layoffs would ne-
gate much of the affirmative action progress achieved through a re-
5. The relationship between seniority systems and the layoff of minorities is a logical
one. Due to an employer's past discriminatory practices, white males will invariably
have accumulated the most seniority. Statistics support this proposition. See U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, LAST HIRED, FIRST FIRED 24-26 (1977) ("In some areas
where minorities represented only 10 to 12 percent of the work force, they accounted
for 60 to 70 percent of those being laid off in 1974.").
6. The court's authority to provide relief for violations of Title VII is found in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982), which provides in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is engaging
in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may en-
join the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and or-
der such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay,... or
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate....
The Code of Federal Regulations defines an affirmative action program as "a set of
specific and result-oriented procedures to which a contractor commits itself to apply
every good faith effort. The objective of these procedures plus such efforts is equal
employment opportunity." 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1984). Employers adopt such pro-
grams voluntarily or pursuant to a court order. When a court concludes that an em-
ployer violated Title VII, it will usually order the offending party to submit a plan
outlining how it intends to make restitution to the individual victims and, further, how
it intends to alter hiring practices to prevent future violations. Often, these plans con-
tain "hiring goals" whereby the employer undertakes, in good faith, to increase the
percentage of minority workers over a period of time, usually to a level that approxi-
mates the percentage of minority workers in the work force. See R. FULLINWIDER,
THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY, 158-62 (1980).
7. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
8. Id. at 2585-90.
9. See Memphis Fire Dep't., 679 F.2d 541, 546 (6th Cir. 1982). The city claimed
that the lay-offs were necessary because of unanticipated decreases in revenue funds and
general increases in operating expenses. The appeals court found that the Mayor had
ultimate authority to determine which classifications the layoffs would affect. Id. at
549.
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cently enacted consent decree."° The district court granted the
injunction, concluding that the proposed layoffs would be racially dis-
criminatory and that the city's seniority system was non-bona fide. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the first part of the
district court's opinion,12 stating that a court is authorized to modify a
consent decree where layoffs caused by an unanticipated economic cri-
sis threaten to frustrate the decree's purpose. 3 Because the district
court found that the city's layoff policy was not adopted with a dis-
criminatory purpose, the court of appeals held that the lower court
erred in ruling the seniority system non-bona fide. 4 On writs of certio-
rari, the Supreme Court reversed. 5 The Court held that the district
court lacked equitable power to modify provisions in a consent decree
relating to the operation of a bona fide seniority system.1
6
10. The consent decree resulted from a 1977 class action suit filed by Carl Stotts
against the Memphis Fire Department, alleging that various hiring and promotion poli-
cies violated Title VII. Id. at 546. Stotts based the allegations on statistics showing a
wide discrepancy between the number of black and white firemen hired or promoted
between 1950 and 1976. Id. at 550. In settling the claim, the parties entered a consent
decree in 1980. The decree's purpose was to "remedy the past hiring and promotion
practices of the Memphis Fire Department with respect to the employment of blacks."
Id. at 575. Specifically, the city agreed to award 50% of all future vacancies to qualified
black applicants. The city further agreed to provide $60,000 in immediate back pay to
be distributed among certain members of the class. Id. at 576.
At the time the city announced the 1981 proposed lay-offs, 18 minority members had
been hired pursuant to the decree. Of these 18, the city slated 15 to be laid off. Simi-
larly, of the 18 blacks the city had promoted under the decree, 14 would be demoted.
See Brief for Plaintiffs at 54, Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct.
2576 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiffs].
11. The district court granted the injunction in an unpublished decision. Stotts v.
Memphis Fire Dep't, No. 77-2014 (W.D. Tenn. 1980) (oral ruling of court granting an
injunction).
12. 679 F.2d 541, 563.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 551, n.6.
15. 104 S. Ct. at 2590. After the district court issued a temporary restraining order
forbidding the city to layoff any black employee, the parties consented to the interven-
tion of Firefighters Local Union 1784. 679 F.2d at 549. Both the city and the union
filed petitions for certiorari.
16. 104 S. Ct. at 2586-90. The Court first recognized the authority of a district
court to modify a consent decree in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
In Swift, defendants requested relief from a consent decree that prohibited their entry
into certain specified businesses. The Court stated that it could not lift the requirements
of the decree when the reasons stated in the complaint continued to exist. Nevertheless,
the Court did acknowledge the inherent "power of a court of equity to modify an in-
junction in adaptation to changed conditions though it was entered by consent." Id. at
114. See also Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952) (consent decree authorizing
1985]
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Concern about the possible effect of Title VII's remedial provisions17
on accrued seniority rights surfaced during the congressional debates
over the Act."8 To ensure passage of the legislation, drafters added
section 703(h)19 to the proposed statute which stated that an employer
could lawfully apply different benefit standards under a bona fide sen-
iority system.20 By granting this measure of immunity to bona fide
ownership of stock cannot be modified without adequate hearing); Chrysler Corpora-
tion v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942) (modification proper where changed circum-
stances would serve to thwart basic purpose of original consent decree). See generally
Rightmeyer and Evans, Brown v. Neeb: Sisyphus at the Summit?, 13 U. TOL. L. REV.
711 (1982) (sketches development of modification doctrine).
The plaintiffs in Stotts argued that while there were no "changed conditions" to jus-
tify a modification under the Swift approach, the proposed layoffs would "thwart the
basic purposes" of the 1980 consent decree and, therefore, modification was warranted
under Chrysler. See Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 10, at 67-68. See generally STATES
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CLEARINGHOUSE PUBLICATION 85, TOWARD AN UNDER-
STANDING OF STOrTr (January 1985).
17. Section 706(g) of Title VII codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) contains
the Act's remedial provisions. See supra note 6 for text of section. Apparently Con-
gress intended courts to have wide discretion in fulfilling their remedial role. The legis-
lative history of the 1972 amendments to the Act provides:
The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide discretion
[in] exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible.
In dealing with the present section 706(g) the courts have stressed that the scope of
relief under that section of the Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful
discrimination whole, and that the attainment of this objective rests not only upon
the elimination of the particular unlawful employment practice complained of, but
also requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful
employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would
have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 1746, 118 CONG. REC. 7166, 7168 (1972).
18. See UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964. See also Joseph,
Last Hired, First Fired Seniority, Lay-offs, and Title VII Questions of Liability and
Remedy, 11 COLUM. J. OF L. & Soc. PROB. 343, 362-74 (1975) (a concise account of
Title VII legislative history).
19. The text of section 703(h), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982), provides in
pertinent part: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of com-
pensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a
bona fide seniority or merit system.... ." Id.
20. Opposition to Title VII centered around the fear that the bill would undermine
existing seniority rights. See Joseph, supra note 18, at 363. To pacify these concerns,
Senators Clark and Case, bi-partisan captains of the bill, issued interpretative memo-
randa insuring that Title VII would not effect vested seniority rights. See 110 CONG.
REC. 7206-07, 7212-15 (1964). Nevertheless, the bill met substantial resistance in the
Senate, which prompted an informal conference between Senators Dirksen, Mansfield,
Kuchel and Humphrey. At this conference, the participants worked out the bill that
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seniority systems, the Act embraced two competing policies: the over-
all goal of eliminating discrimination in employment, and the desire to
insulate the collective bargaining process from excessive judicial and
governmental interference. 2
The initial court decisions dealing with the conflict between seniority
systems and efforts to ensure equal employment opportunity reveal the
courts' tendency to seek the immediate elimination of discrimination.22
This predisposition often resulted in the displacement of facially neu-
tral seniority systems that served to "lock-in" the effects of past dis-
crimination. 23  In Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc. ,24 a group of black
employees alleged that the company's use of a departmental seniority
system 21 violated Title VII. The company asserted that because the
eventually became law. As explained by Senator Humphrey, the conferees added a new
subsection, 703(h), which "provid[ed] that it is not unlawful employment practice for
an employer to maintain different terms, conditions, or privileges ... pursuant to a
seniority. . system, provided that the differences are not the result of an intention to
discriminate." 110 CONG. REC. 12723 (1964).
Because the drafters formulated the bill at an informal conference, there was no for-
mal committee report from which to gauge legislative intent. These gaps have led both
courts and commentators to question the validity of any conclusions drawn from state-
ments made during the congressional debates. See Joseph, supra note 18, at 369 (point-
ing out that "... section 703(h) is not simply a recapitulation of the Clark views but a
new provision reflecting the outcome of the process of reconciling opposing viewpoints
.. "); See also Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416
F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (legislative materials "singu-
larly uninstructive on seniority rights"). Despite these conflicting views, the Supreme
Court has viewed these statements as the genesis of the bona fide seniority system ex-
emption under section 703(h). See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 350 (1977).
21. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982). The Court observed
that "Congress was well aware in 1964 that the overall purpose of Title VII, to elimi-
nate discrimination in employment, inevitably would, on occasion, conflict with the pol-
icy favoring minimal supervision by courts and other governmental agencies over the
substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements." Id. at 76-77.
22. See, e-g., United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 471 F.2d 582, 587-88 (4th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 1893 (1973) (departmental seniority systems not ex-
empt under section 703(h)); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 658-
60 (2d Cir. 1971) (departmental seniority system perpetuates past discrimination poli-
cies); Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980,
995 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (section 703(h) merely proscribes
creation of fictional seniority); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516
(E.D. Va. 1968) (Congress never intended to immunize seniority systems that lock in
effects of past discrimination).
23. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
24. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
25. There are three basic types of seniority systems, though each may have many
1985]
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system applied equally to all employees it fell within the section 703(h)
exemption for bona fide seniority systems.26 The district court rejected
this argument, concluding that Congress, by extending this immunity,
never intended to validate present differences in seniority resulting
from intentional discriminatory policies.27
Other courts have followed the Quarles court's reasoning.28 The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Local 189 United Papermak-
ers and Paperworkers v. United States,29 considered a case factually
similar to Quarles. The court, applying Quarles, observed that Title
VII did not protect departmental seniority systems that perpetuated or
exaggerated the prior effects of discrimination,30 and confirmed the dis-
trict court's authority to modify the system to eliminate such effects. 31
variations. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 4, at 1602. The first type, "employment senior-
ity," is the most common. Under the employment systems a worker's seniority is deter-
mined by the total number of years he has worked with the company. The second type,
"departmental seniority," requires a worker, upon transfer to a new department, to
forfeit his accumulated seniority and start at the bottom of the ladder in the new depart-
ment. The third type of system is based on "lines of progression." The company ranks
different jobs according to their desirability, and when a vacancy opens the company
awards the job to the worker with the most seniority in the job below.
Cooper & Sobol, supra note 4, at 1602.
26. See supra note 19 for pertinent text of the section.
27. 279 F. Supp. at 518. The Supreme Court adopted the Quarles approach in
Griggs Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a case that dealt with diploma and intelligence testing
requirements as a criteria of employment or job transfers. In Griggs, the Court stated
that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment prac-
tices, not simply the motivation." Id. at 432 (emphasis in original). Chief Justice Bur-
ger further asserted in the Court's opinion that "[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures,
or tests neutral on their face and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."
Id. at 430.
Some commentators have relied on this statement to argue that section 703(h) never
was intended to protect seniority systems that perpetuate past discrimination. See gen-
erally Joseph, Last Hired, First Fired Seniority, supra note 18; Note, Title VII, Seniority
Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1260 (1967).
28. See supra note 27.
29. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
30. Id. at 990. The Court's language, however, seemed to imply exception to this
rule. It stated that "[t]o the extent that Crown and the White union insisted upon
carrying forward exclusion of a racially-determined class, without business necessity,
they committed, with the requisite intent, in the statutory sense, an unfair employment
practice as defined by Title VII." Id. at 997 (emphasis in original). This concern for
requisite intent established the fissure which, in later cases, becomes a clear break with
traditional reasoning. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
31. 416 F.2d at 989 (citing Local 53 of lnt' Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators v.
Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969)).
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The Papermakers Court then addressed two issues that the Quarles
court failed to confront. Although the court first recognized that ad-
justing seniority rights of minorities might affect incumbent employ-
ees, 2 it nevertheless determined that in this case the adjustments were
designed to minimize such an effect.33 The court reasoned that because
department seniority remained between white employees bidding for
the same job, it was displacing only the expectations created by prior
discriminatory practices.34 Second, and of larger implication, the court
interpreted section 703(h) as proscribing the creation of fictional sen-
iority for newly hired minorities and stated that a system could only
base adjustments in minority seniority rights on time actually
worked.35
Significantly, the decisions following Quarles and Papermakers36 all
have involved departmental seniority systems rather than employment
seniority systems.37 In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Workers of Interna-
tional Harvester,38 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit based
its holding on this distinction. 9 In Waters, the district court applied
32. Id. at 994-95. The Papermakers court imposed an employment seniority system
on the company that, in effect, displaced the expectations of incumbent white employees
who as a result would now have to compete with minority workers from other depart-
ments for future job openings. Id. at 995. The court sought to minimize this displace-
ment by allowing white employees to retain their department seniority status when
bidding against other white employees. Id. at 998.
33. Id. at 998.
34. Id. at 988. The court further pointed out that under the district court's order
minorities would be eligible to compete only for the vacancies immediately above them.
Id. at 985. This provision lessened the disruptive impact that the modification had on
the existing order because minorities would still have to move up job by job. Id.
35. Id. at 995. The view that Congress never contemplated fictional, or "retroac-
tive," seniority stems from the belief that Congress' primary concern was to compensate
only the actual victims of discrimination. Thus, the court in Papermakers stated: "re-
quiring employers to correct their pre-Act discrimination by creating fictional seniority
for new Negro employees would not necessarily aid the actual victims of the previous
discrimination .... The clear thrust of the Senate debate [on Title VII] is directed
against such preferential treatment on the basis of race." Id. While the courts are still
concerned with limiting relief to actual victims of discrimination, they deny that Con-
gress intended Title VII to proscribe an award of retroactive seniority. See Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (adequate relief would be denied absent an
award of retroactive seniority).
36. See supra note 22 for a list of cases following Quarles and Papermakers.
37. See supra note 25 for a discussion of the distinctions between the various types
of seniority systems.
38. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).
39. Id. at 1321.
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the Quarles rule to find that Wisconsin Steel's employment seniority
system was not bona fide because the company had engaged in discrim-
inatory hiring practices. 4' The court of appeals confirmed the district
court's finding of discriminatory hiring practices, but disagreed with its
application of the Quarles reasoning.41 The court distinguished an em-
ployment seniority system based on the "last hired, first fired" princi-
ple from a departmental seniority system." In the court's view, only a
"last hired, first fired" system created "artificial expectations" of sen-
iority on behalf of white employees having equal or fewer years of ser-
vice than minority employees.43 The court concluded, therefore, that
because the employment system equally recognized an employee's total
length of service, the system did not of itself perpetuate past discrimi-
nation, and was therefore protected under section 703(h) of the Act.'
After Waters, courts were prone to find that seniority systems vio-
lated Title VII if they rested upon prior discriminatory job assignments
or contained unreasonable barriers to inter-departmental transfer, but
not when the system based seniority on the length of company employ-
ment.4" Consistent with Quarles and Papermakers, courts customarily
looked upon section 703(h) as little more than a bar to an award of
constructive seniority.46 Not until 1976 did the Supreme Court ad-
dress this view.
In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,47 a trucking company engaged in
a pattern of racial discrimination in the hiring of people for its higher
paying positions. The plaintiff class consisted of both black employees
who had been denied transfer to the more lucrative spots and non-
40. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Workers of Int'l Harvester, 301 F. Supp, 663, 665
(N.D. Ill. 1969).
41. 502 F.2d at 1320.
42. Id.
43. Id. For example, in a departmental seniority system, two employees, one black
and one white, are hired at the same time. Due to the racial barriers to interdepartment
transfer white employees move into new departments much sooner than black employ-
ees. The white employee's expectations of greater seniority within the department are
thus artificial because both employees have worked the same number of years.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. See Comment, Employment Discrimination-Seniority Systems Under Title VII,
62 N.C.L. REv. 357, 363 (1984). See also Watkins v. United Steelworkers, Local 2369,
516 F.2d 41, 44-45 (5th Cir. 1975) (plant-wide seniority system, despite disparate effect
on minorities during periods of layoff, treats all employees equally) (emphasis added).
46. See supra note 35.
47. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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employees whose applications the company turned down outright.
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan abandoned the restrictive
view of section 703(h)4 8 and awarded constructive seniority to both
classes of discrimination victims.4 9 Justice Brennan asserted that read-
ing section 703(h) to bar constructive seniority would contravene the
congressional policy of "make-whole" relief expressed in other provi-
sions of Title VIi 50
While Franks expanded the relief available to post-Act discrimina-
tion victims, it left unresolved the issue of whether or not section
703(h) immunized seniority systems that perpetuated pre-Act discrimi-
nation. The Court, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States,51 settled this controversy by holding that a seniority system
does not become unlawful under Title VII merely because it preserves
the effects of pre-Act discrimination. 52 The Teamsters fact situation
was similar to Franks. Both cases involved trucking companies that
48. Id. at 761-62.
49. Id. at 767-69. Applying the Papermakers reasoning, the district court denied
the award of any constructive seniority. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of
constructive seniority to the nonemployees who had been hired subsequently, but
awarded seniority to the employees who had been denied transfer. See 424 U.S. at 752.
Justice Brennan found no support for this distinction in either the body of Title VII or
its legislative history. Id. at 768. In collapsing the distinction between discriminatory
hiring and discriminatory job assignments, Brennan laid the groundwork for the
Court's decision in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977). See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Teamsters.
50. 424 U.S. at 758. Justice Brennan specifically cited certain amendments to
§ 706(g) made in 1972 as authorizing the grant of constructive seniority. See supra note
6 for text of section as amended. The new § 706(g), Justice Brennan reasoned, con-
ferred broad powers on the courts to fashion the most complete relief possible. 424 U.S.
at 764. He then pointed out that, absent an award of constructive seniority, the individ-
ual victim "will perpetually remain subordinate to persons who, but for the illegal dis-
crimination, would have been in respect to entitlement to those [seniority-related]
benefits his inferiors." To support his views on "make-whole" relief, Justice Brennan
relied on statements made during the congressional debates on the amended provisions:
The provisions are intended to give the courts wide discretion exercising their equi-
table powers to fashion the most complete relief possible.... [T]he Act is intended
to make the victim of unlawful employment discrimination whole, and . . .the
attainment of this objective.., requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences
and effects of the unlawful employment practices be... restored to a position
where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
Id. at 764, quoting, 118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7168 (1972) (section-by-section analysis).
See also note 17 for discussion of policies behind Title VII remedial provisions.
51. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
52. Id. at 353-54.
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denied minorities applications for more desirable "line-driver" jobs.53
In Teamsters, however, the company maintained a departmental sen-
iority system that required employees transferring to line driver posi-
tions to forfeit their prior company seniority.54 The Court upheld this
system as bona fide while maintaining that under Franks, post-Act vic-
tims of discrimination,55 either in initial application for employment or
application for interdepartment transfer, could obtain retroactive sen-
iority effective to their date of application.56
The Teamsters Court employed a two-pronged test for determining
whether a seniority system was bona fide." Under this test, if the pro-
visions of the system apply equally to all workers, and if the system is
not adopted for any illegal or discriminatory purpose, then it is lawful
under Title VII.5 Therefore, unless one could prove that a company
adopted its seniority system with an intent to discriminate, the system
53. Id. at 329. Line drivers are long distance drivers who drive between the com-
pany terminals. These jobs are more desirable because a part of an employee's wages
are determined by the mileage he travels. See id. at n.3.
54. Id. at 344. This system affected minority seniority rights the same way as the
systems in Quarles and Papermakers did. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Quarles and Papermakers. Minority employees who eventually re-
ceived line-driver jobs were "forever junior to white line drivers hired" at the same time.
431 U.S. at 344 n.27.
55. Id. at 347. Though Teamsters purports to limit relief to individual post-Act
discriminatees, it is unclear whether, in Title VII class actions, courts must always limit
relief in this manner. In University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 301
(1978), the Supreme Court recognized that race-conscious remedies are sometimes ap-
propriate for Title VII violations. Though the Court emphasized that in every case
where such relief had been granted there was a determination of previous discrimina-
tion, it stopped short of requiring that individuals within the class show personal injury.
Id.
56. 431 U.S. at 363-64. The Court did not limit the group of victims allowed to
recover to those who actually applied for the line driver openings. If nonapplicants
could prove that but for the well known discriminatory hiring practices they would have
applied for the job, they would be eligible for seniority retroactive to the date at which
the vacancy opened. The Court noted, however, that proving such claims would be
very difficult. Id.
57. Id. at 356.
58. Id. In effect, the Teamsters decision overrules the distinction between depart-
mental and company-wide seniority systems with respect to differences caused by pre-
Act discriminatory practices. The Court observed that "[a]lthough a seniority system
inevitably tends to perpetuate the effects of pre-Act discrimination in such cases, the
congressional judgment was that Title VII should not outlaw the use of existing senior-
ity lists and thereby destroy or water down the vested seniority rights of employees
simply because their employer had engaged in discrimination prior to the passage of the
Act." Id. at 353.
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fell within the protection of section 703(h).59
The Supreme Court, however, had still not decided whether an af-
firmative action program designed to remedy prior discrimination
could override the provisions of a bona fide seniority system. The
lower courts had dealt with this issue since 1975, but produced incon-
sistent decisions due to differing views concerning a court's authority
to modify a consent decree that was silent regarding the employer's
policy on layoffs.'
In Jersey Power & Light Co. v. IBEW,6" an employer, anticipating
layoffs, faced a conflict between following a conciliation agreement out-
lining a five year minority hiring plan or abiding by a collective bar-
gaining agreement containing a "last hired, first fired" provision.62
Relying on basic contract principles,63 the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the collective bargaining agreement controlled because
the parties directed the conciliation agreement only at new hiring. 6  In
dicta, the court remarked that public policy supports a facially neutral
seniority system, and thus a court could not modify the system by
59. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 277 (1982) ("showing of disparate
impact is insufficient to invalidate a seniority system, even though the result may be to
perpetuate pre-Act discrimination."); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63,
65 (1982) ("the fact that a seniority system has a discriminatory impact is not, by itself,
sufficient to invalidate the system; actual intent to discriminate must be proved."). See
generally Comment, Employment Discrimination, supra note 45.
60. See infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
61. 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
62. Id. at 696.
63. The Supreme Court explained the rule governing the construction of consent
decrees in United States v. Armour and Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971):
Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has
produced agreement on their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate
the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and
inevitable risk of litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a
compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties
each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with litiga-
tion..... For these reasons, the scope of a consent decree must be discerned within
its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purpose of one of
the parties to it.... [T]he instrument must be construed as it is written, and not as
it might have been written....
Id. See also United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 (1975)
("Since consent decrees and orders have many of the attributes of normal contracts,
they should be construed basically as contracts.").
64. 508 F.2d at 702.
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decree.65
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, in Brown v. Neeb,66
held that a district court had inherent authority to modify a consent
decree to prohibit layoffs based upon seniority, if such layoffs destroyed
affirmative action progress.67 The court found power to override the
collective bargaining agreement and the relevant Ohio statute68 in the
supremacy clause. 69 The court distinguished Teamsters7" by pointing
out it was a Title VII decision, whereas the Brown plaintiffs based their
complaint on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.71
Other circuit courts have followed the reasoning in Brown. 2 These
65. Id. at 705. See supra note 16 for a discussion of the scope of a court's authority
to modify a consent decree.
66. 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981).
67. Id. at 560.
68. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 124.37 (Page 1984) provides: "When it becomes nec-
essary in a police or fire department, through lack of work or funds.., to reduce the
force in such department, the youngest employee in point of service shall be first laid
off."
69. The court adopted the position that nothing in the district court's order actually
forced the city to violate the statute or the collective bargaining agreement. The city
could decline to lay off any personnel and balance its budget in other ways. 644 F.2d at
563. Because the city chose to layoff personnel, the supremacy clause, U.S. CONsT. art.
VI, cl. 2, required that the federal court order supersede state law. 644 F.2d at 563.
In concurrence, Judge Brown found it ill-advised to invoke the supremacy clause to
uphold the district court order. In his view, both the court order and the collective
bargaining agreement remained enforceable against the city. This put the burden on the
city to decide how it would swallow the losses that its own former discriminatory poli-
cies created. Id. at 564-66.
The Supreme Court recently applied this approach in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local
Union 759, 103 S. Ct. 2177 (1983). The union alleged that the company violated the
seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement by laying off members. In up-
holding the award of relief, the Court recognized the company's dilemma, but stated
that the company could blame only itself. Id. at 2184.
70. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
71. 644 F.2d at 564. Perhaps recognizing the tenuous nature of this distinction, the
Brown court stated that it did "not think that Teamsters can bar relief sought to remedy
constitutional violations under § 1983, or under a consent decree." Id. (emphasis ad-
ded). This passage strongly suggests that the court would have authorized modification
even if the suit had been brought under Title VII.
72. See Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982) ("reme-
dial relief for the effects of past discrimination need not be color blind ... use of minor-
ity-conscious percentage goals ... is constitutionally permissible."); Stotts v. Memphis
Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982) (trial court had authority to override the
firefighter's union seniority provisions to effectuate the purpose of the 1980 Decree);
Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., Inc., 655 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1981) (employer can
temporarily override the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to a
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courts were willing to modify seniority provisions if the effectiveness of
court-ordered relief was at stake.73 This willingness, however, poten-
tially conflicted with the Supreme Court's more restrictive position es-
tablished in Teamsters.74 The Sixth Circuit's decision in Stotts75
prompted the Supreme Court to finally confront this line of reasoning.
After disposing of an initial mootness issue,7 6 the Court in Stotts ad-
dressed the Sixth Circuit's contention that the injunction merely en-
forced the terms of the agreed upon consent decree.77 Justice White,
valid affirmative action plan); Bolden v. Penn. State Police, 578 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1978)
(modification is appropriate where bona fide seniority system operates to hinder reme-
dies designed to eliminate discrimination). But see Youngblood v. Dalzell, 568 F.2d 506
(1978) (affirmed district court's refusal to modify consent decree where unanticipated
layoffs had devastating effect on minority hiring goals).
73 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
74. Teamsters clearly established that the discriminatory impact caused by the ap-
plication of an otherwise neutral seniority system was alone insufficient to render that
system unlawful. 431 U.S. 324, 352-53. By modifying consent decrees to circumvent
bona fide seniority systems, however, the lower courts were ruling that companies could
not emulate systems having a discriminatory effect. The court in Brown noted that
"[w]hile a bona-fide seniority system may not itself violate the law, such a system can-
not be allowed to obstruct remedies designed to overcome past discrimination." 644
F.2d at 564.
75. 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982).
76. The respondents argued that the 1981 preliminary injunction did not perma-
nently enjoin the city from conducting layoffs in accordance with its existing seniority
system; the injunction, they claimed, pertained only to the 1981 layoffs. The city had
since returned all employees laid off or demoted as a result of the injunction to their
former positions. The respondents contended, therefore, that the injunction was no
longer effective and the case was moot. See Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 10.
Justice White rejected this argument. First, he asserted that the court never vacated
the injunction and thus it would "appear" that the city must comply with the order in
the event of future layoffs. 104 S. Ct. at 2583. Second, even if the injunction applied
only to the 1981 layoffs, Justice White expressed concern that the rulings upon which
the injunction was predicated might have some precedential effect in future litigation.
Id. Last, Justice White pointed out that while all the jobs may have been restored, the
issues of back pay and lost seniority still existed. Id.
In dissent, Justice Blackmun formulated a strong argument. Relying on Article III of
the Constitution, he reminded the Court that a justiciable controversy must precede the
exercise of federal jurisdiction. In his opinion, none existed. Further, he stated that the
Court's usual practice of vacating the judgment and remanding with orders to dismiss
would resolve any res judicata concerns the majority might have. Id. at 2596 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2585. The relevant portions of the consent decree read as follows:
This Decree is entered into as a settlement of an existing dispute between plaintiffs
and defendants as to appropriate and valid procedures for the hiring and promo-
tion of Fire Department personnel for the City of Memphis. It also provides for
specific, definable and good faith efforts to be made by defendants to achieve cer-
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writing for the majority, relied on the "four-corners" approach to re-
fute this argument.78 Because the decree failed to mention the city's
layoff and demotion policy, Justice White concluded that it would be
unreasonable to assume that the parties intended to alter the seniority
system or the city's arrangements with the Union;79 a modification to
this effect, therefore, would exceed the district court's authority to en-
force the terms of the decree.80
In determining the scope of a district court's authority to modify a
consent decree, Justice White relied on the Teamsters decision and
statements made during congressional debates over Title VII.81 These
sources indicated that courts could grant specific, "make whole" relief
only to actual victims of illegal discrimination.82 Justice White thus
concluded that even if the district court had found that a pattern or
practice of discrimination existed,83 it would have been inappropriate
tain goals of employment of blacks. This Consent Decree satisfies and resolves all
claims of plaintiffs ... of racial discrimination.... The purpose of this decree is to
remedy the past hiring and promotion practices of the Memphis Fire Department
with respect to the employment of blacks .... Goals established herein are to be
interpreted as objectives which require reasonable, good faith efforts. ... Both
plaintiffs and the class they represent shall seek no further relief for the acts, prac-
tices or omissions alleged in the complaints save to enforce the provisions of this
Decree....
679 F.2d 541, 574 (1982).
The respondents argued that because the Mayor was responsible for classifying which
employees were subject to layoffs, his decision to include in that classification the jobs
with the largest ratio of blacks constituted a breach of the decree's good faith require-
ments. See Supplemental Memorandum in Support of a Preliminary Injunction at 2-3,
Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, No. 77-2014 (W.D. Tenn. 1980).
78. See supra note 63 for a discussion of the four-comers approach.
79. 104 S. Ct. at 2586.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2588-90 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) and 118 CONG. REC. 7167
(1972)). See also supra notes 51-59 for a discussion of International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
82. 104 S. Ct. at 2590 n.15. See supra note 50 for a discussion of the Court's views
on proper scope of make-whole relief. Justice White realized that only individuals able
to prove the discriminatory practice affected them should receive relief. 104 S. Ct. at
2589.
83. 104 S. Ct. at 2588. Justice White cited the fact that the lower court did not
litigate the factual issue of whether the city had discriminated, and that the city, in the
consent decree, expressly denied having engaged in any discriminatory activity. See
Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 679 F.2d 541, 573-78 (1982), for the text of con-
sent decree. Prior to Stotts, all the circuit courts granting modification found the em-
ployer discriminated. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the circuit court holdings.
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for the court to modify the decree and grant specific relief.8 4 Implicit
in the Court's analysis is the assumption that the district court's pre-
liminary injunction constituted individual awards of constructive
seniority. s 5
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun admonished the Court for ignoring
the appropriate standard of review for a preliminary injunction. 6 By
treating the district court proceedings as a request for a permanent in-
junction, the Court, in effect, deprived the respondents of an opportu-
nity to substantiate their discrimination claims, and then penalized
them for not having done so.8 7
Justice Blackmun stated that, had the case gone to trial, the respon-
dents might well have shown that the city violated the decree's good
faith requirements." In such case, the injunction would have been
proper as enforcing the terms of the decree.8 9 Finally, Justice Black-
mun argued that in Title VII class action suits the concept of race con-
scious affirmative relief was often appropriate.9 Although individual
84. 104 S. Ct. at 2588.
85. Justice Blackmun strenuously objected to this characterization of the district
court order. He remarked:
In the instant case, respondents' request for a preliminary injunction did not in-
clude a request for individual awards of retroactive seniority-and, contrary to the
implication of the Court's opinion, the District Court did not make any such
awards. Rather, the District Court order required the city to conduct its layoffs in
a race-conscious manner...
104 S. Ct. at 2606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 2600-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court articulated the proper
standard in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975), where it stated that
"the standard of appellate review is simply whether the issuance of the injunction, in
light of the applicable standard, constituted an abuse of discretion." Id. In contrast, a
court issues a permanent injunction after a full trial on the merits and the decision is
therefore open to full judicial review. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390,
396 (1981). Justice Blackmun asserted that rather than reviewing the propriety of
granting the preliminary injunction, the Court erroneously undertook an evaluation of
the underlying legal claims. 104 S. Ct. at 2602.
In a separate concurrence, Justice O'Connor replied to this argument by pointing out
that the respondents had no chance of succeeding on the merits of their claim and that,
therefore, the Court merely denied the district court's order as an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 2594 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 2603.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2603-04. Justice Blackmun thought the respondents based their respect
for injunctive relief on this claim. He disagreed with the Court's view that the respon-
dents were interested mainly in the modification of the decree. Id. at 2603.
90. Id. at 2609.
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class members have no claim to the relief, in such cases they avoid
having to show a personal injury resulting from the discrimination.91
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts clearly follows the Team-
sters approach of protecting bona fide seniority systems from Title VII
scrutiny.92 Unlike the Quarles and Papermakers courts, the Supreme
Court accords little weight to the disparate impact a seniority system
may have on minorities.93 Instead, the Court valued Congress' legiti-
mate concern that affirmative action not be taken at the expense of
incumbent employees.94 In recognizing this concern, however, the
Court fails to articulate a reason why affirmative action may be im-
peded at the expense of innocent minorities. Finally, the Stotts opinion
reflects the current disfavor with which the Court looks upon the idea
of race-conscious relief in situations where vested seniority rights are at
stake.95 The Court continues to view such a remedy as inconsistent
with a clear congressional intent to limit Title VII to actual victims of
discrimination. 96
The Court's decision may warrant criticism for its failure to consider
the countervailing factors that will inevitably result. Having forfeited
their right to pursue alternative remedies, 97 the respondents will invari-
ably shoulder the burden of future layoffs. The city, free to conduct
layoffs in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, need no
longer consider the racial imbalances that will result from such layoffs.
Under the Court's opinion, it is of no consequence that such imbal-
91. Id.
92. See 431 U.S. at 324, 352-53 (1977). See supra notes 51-59 for a discussion of
Teamsters.
93. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
95. This attitude, however, does not extend to situations where cities adopt affirma-
tive action programs voluntarily. In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979), a union and a company voluntarily entered a collective bargaining
agreement designed to "eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances." Id. at 198. Under
the agreement, the company established job training programs to teach unskilled work-
ers the skills necessary to become craft workers. The company reserved 50% of the
openings in these programs for blacks and thus many of the black employees admitted
had less seniority than rejected white applicants. In upholding this agreement, the
Court stated that Title VII did not forbid "private employers and unions from volunta-
rily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans that accord racial preferences...."
Id. at 200.
96. 104 S. Ct. at 2588 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324, 367-71 (1977)).
97. See supra note 77 for text of consent decree.
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ances are a result of the city's former discriminatory hiring practices.9"
The Court responds to this charge by baldly asserting that no actual
finding of discrimination had ever been made.99
Despite this apparent inequity, the Stotts opinion deserves praise for
the role it will play in facilitating voluntary settlement of Title VII
disputes. In light of Stotts, attorneys negotiating future consent decrees
will be more careful to spell out the policies for determining layoffs and
demotions.'0 A possible result of more thoughtful drafting, however,
may be greater reluctance of employers to engage in voluntary settle-
ments. Companies are unlikely to enter into consent decrees contain-
ing specific provisions on layoff procedures if such provisions conflict
with the terms of their collective bargaining agreements. 1 ' Rather,
they may take their chances in court and leave to minority plaintiffs the
difficult task of proving an employer's subjective intent to discriminate
in adopting its seniority system. 0 2 What remains clear from the Stotts
opinion is that, absent a specific provision to the contrary, employers
are free to conduct layoffs according to a bona fide seniority system.
Eugene A. Boyle
98 See supra note 69.
99. 104 S Ct. at 2588. As the dissent points out in the following passage, this asser-
tion penalizes the respondents for failing to prove an issue that never went to trial: The
whole point of the consent decree in these cases... is for both parties to avoid the time
and expense of litigating the question of liability and identifying the victims of discrimi-
nation In the instant consent decree, the city expressly denied having engaged in any
discrimination at all. Nevertheless the consent decree in this case provided several per-
sons with promotions and back pay
Id. at 2607 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. See Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 10, at 69.
101 See supra note 69 for a discussion of the Court's opinion in W.R. Grace & Co.
v. Local Union 759, 103 S. Ct. 2177 (1983).
102. See supra note 59.
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